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Cleveland-Marshall College of Law 
 
 
TO:    Federal Communications Commission  
 
FROM:   Professor Candice Hoke, Founding Director, Center for Election Integrity 
(Election security  & constitutional federalism specialist; Team Leader for portion of 
California Top to Bottom Review of voting systems; co-author of election forensics 
monograph; Election Law professor; Ohio spokesperson for Election Protection Coalition, 
2008; Yale Law J.D.;  Yale Law Journal editor.  
 
DATE:   December 9. 2009 
 
RE:     FCC 09-47, 09-51, 09-137;  NPB Pub Not #20 
______________________________________________________________________________                          
 
Thank you for requesting comments on expanding civic participation in voting by 
expanded use of the Internet.   
 
As a law professor teaching Regulatory Law and Election Law, I have closely followed, 
analyzed and taught the FCC’s approach to maintaining Internet neutrality, which has 
been an outstanding success thus far.  I hope, however, the FCC will not become involved 
in election regulatory issues concerning the Internet, but will support a different federal 
regulatory agency with national security and technical-cybersecurity expertise receiving 
primary jurisdiction over election cybersecurity.      
 
This memo briefly responds to the questions you posed (Part A), provides some bullet 
points of my professional expertise relatd to election and technical security issues (Part B), 
and attaches a paper delivered at an international, interdisciplinary conference in Prague 
to discuss formulating better Internet governance.    The paper addresses for Internet 
voting governance issues. 
 
A.  ISSUES AND SUMMARY ANSWERS   
 
a. With existing technology, is it possible to enable and ensure safe  and secure voting 
online today?  
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A:  No, it is not.  Please see the SERVE Report and the attached paper delivered this past 
summer on Internet voting governance issues, which cites the SERVE Report;  the 
Technologists’ Statement on Internet Voting, and the submission to the FCC from Dr. 
David Jefferson.     
 
b. What can we learn from other nations that have considered or implemented online 
voting?   
 
A:  This is too large a question for short comments.  Suffice it to say that neither Estonia 
nor Switzerland are comparable to the US in relevant factors, especially the payoff for a 
successful disruption or manipulation of federal elections.   
 
c. What can we learn from pilot projects that have tested online voting? 
 
A:  If you are speaking of domestic pilot projects, none of these pilots have been properly 
structured to test for and approximate the risks that would be posed to domestic US 
elections.  They are especially remiss in conceptualizing the risks for elections to Federal 
and Statewide office, where the fiscal control over billions of dollars is concerned, and the 
direction of military powers and foreign policy/aid.   
 
The Internet voting pilot programs were structured by for-profit vendors, who also reported 
on their “success” without any independent evaluation and transparency on some critical 
dimensions.  In Hawai’i, the project did report a dramatic drop in the reported rate of 
voter participation.  The pilot, however, did not include any structures by which an 
assessment could be conducted of whether technical attacks had occurred to intercept, 
modify or otherwise block voted ballots from reaching the election processing location.  
Nor did it offer any auditing assessments that the ballots as tabulated matched the ballots 
as cast by voters.  Thus, no conclusions can be drawn about the pilot’s success, and it 
bears little relation to a Federal or Statewide election context. 
 
Over the past year, those of us involved in election security and legitimacy have observed 
newly expanded governmental efforts at the State and Federal levels to use the Internet for 
voting (“IV”), including for the most sensitive cargo of all -- return of voted (marked) 
ballots for tabulation.  This pressure is occurring despite computer and network security 
scientists’ pointed criticism of the extraordinary risks they  would generate to the 
legitimacy of our elections, and especially for the foreign intrusions into our election 
voting records and results.  The regulators have generally then replied:  then tell us how to 
reduce the risks in Internet voting, so we can vote over the Internet. 
 
A preeminent MIT computer scientist who also has served on the Federal Technical 
Guidelines Development Committee for the US Election Assistance Commission, Dr. Ron 
Rivest, has noted that asking how to reduce the risks in Internet voting by formulating 
“best practices” so Internet voting can be broadly and quickly launched, is analogous to 
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inquiring how to drive drunk more safely.  The risks of drunk driving and Internet voting 
(especially the risks attending the Internet transmission of voted ballots) are so 
incontrovertible to those who are knowledgeable in these fields that asking these 
questions is obvious, palpable nonsense.  Unfortunately, the regulators thus far interested 
in promoting the expanded use of the Internet in voting/elections have lacked a sufficient 
understanding of network and computer security, election security, and their relation to 
this nation’s national security interests, that a bandwagon is beginning to develop for 
Internet voting in the US.  The FCC should  assist in arresting this development, literally 
pro bono publico  and perhaps even the survival of the US as an independent nation.   
 
For-profit Internet voting vendors have underestimated the risks and overstated the 
reliability and other performance features of their Internet voting software.  It appears we 
may be facing a redux of the electronic voting system debacles that wasted public monies 
and lost votes over the past decade.    
 
d. Have localities or states enabled online voting either domestically or for citizens abroad 
(such as military personnel stationed overseas)?  
 
A:  Several States and localities, and the US EAC are moving in this direction now.  The 
attached paper (presented at the international Internet governance conference in 2008) 
calls for a nuanced approach to IV.   
 
e. Do government jurisdictions at any level, domestic or foreign, allow online voting for 
any citizen? Have there been quantifiable impacts tied to oiline voting, including impacts 
on the number of  citizens that voted? Have there been qualitative impacts tied to online 
voting, either positive or negative?  
 
A:  I defer to others to provide data here.   
 
f. What are the security and privacy risks that government jurisdictions must consider 
when considering the implementation of  online voting?  
 
A:  See the attached article and its citations, including to the SERVE Report, the NIST 
Report on Internet voting risks, the statement submitted to the FCC by the Verified Voting 
Foundation and VVOrganization, and the statement from Dr. David Jefferson. 
 
g. What are the history and current state of play of online voting technologies?  
 
A:  Far too broad a question to answer here.  
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h. What are best practice processes concerning online voting?   
 
A:  See the attached article;  also, recall that asking for “best practices in internet voting” is 
akin to asking for “best practices for drunk driving.”  (per Dr. Ron Rivest, as noted supra).   
If we are attentive to the risks of the Internet, and the critical importance of honest, 
transparent, and auditable elections for legitimacy of our government, we don’t want to 
move into Internet voting.   
 
i. How would enabling online voting impact overseas military personnel, overseas 
diplomatic personnel or other Americans living overseas?  
 
Undoubtedly, these Americans would believe they are participating in a convenient and 
safe manner in US elections.  But the Internet cannot provide at a high degree of 
assurance that the votes as cast will reach the election offices. 
 
Use of the Internet for transmitting ballot materials, and for providing a range of other 
election information and services may offer far better risk-benefit ratios, and should be the 
focus of any Federal or State efforts to use the Internet in voting.   
 
Part B.  Brief Overview of the Author’s Expertise 
 
Credentials (excerpt) of Professor Candice Hoke  
 
• J.D., Yale Law School; Senior Editor, Yale Law Journal  
• Professor of Election Law, Regulatory Federalism, and Employment Law; previously 
taught Federal Jurisdiction, Constitutional Federalism.   
 
• Research Team Leader in the California Secretary of State’s Top to Bottom Review 
(TTBR) of Voting Systems (for the Diebold Election System Documentation Team); 
participated in open-ended vulnerability “red team” testing with the TTBR’s 
preeminent computer security scientists; discussed findings regarding the security, 
reliability, and accuracy of three major voting systems. 
 
• Consultant assisting in formation of Ohio’s EVEREST study of voting system 
vulnerabilities; planned Election Day 2007 on-site security evaluations for 11 
counties (ultimately not funded). 
 
• Co-author (with prominent national security computer scientists) monograph on 
election forensics for digital elections and other election security reports and 
academic papers.  
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• Member of the American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Election Law, 
Advisory Commission, recruited to serve as the voting technology expert.  (Three 
terms, 2007-present) 
  
• Project Director of the Public Monitor of Cuyahoga Election Reform, as part of the 
Center for Election Integrity, in which we conducted unprecedented election 
security technical and operational assessments for an urban election office  
(Cleveland, Ohio). 
 
• Member, Cuyahoga Election Review Panel, which investigated and published a 
lengthy report on the nationally notorious 2006 Federal primary in Ohio’s most 
populous urban county;  documented many grave failures in election security. 
 
• Testified before Congress (House Administration) on election verification, and also 
the U.S. Election Assistance Commission on election technology and election 
accountability issues, including Tracking Voting System Performance (Dec. 2008).  
http://www.eac.gov/News/meetings/12-08-08-public-meeting-washington-d-c 
 
 
 
Part C. Election Cybersecurity Memorandum Submission by Professor Hoke to the 
Executive Office of the President, June 2008 (slightly revised but not updated or 
substantively modified) 
 
“Elec t ion  cyberse curi t y” here refers to the security of the computers and networks used to record, 
process, and report the votes, which includes all electronic and electromagnetic communications, 
including telephony, fax, and Internet, in each case whether wired or wireless, analog or digital.    
 
A.  Essential Questions and Answers regarding Election Cybersecurity 
 
1. Are Federal elections currently vulnerable to attacks similar to those that generated the President’s 
cybersecurity review and initiative?  
 
 Yes.  Election systems have been among the victims of known, widespread malware attacks, 
and at least two examples of targeted attacks. Further, election administrators lack the 
information security expertise to harden their systems and to protect vulnerable information 
and systems that range from voter registration databases to remote transmissions of election 
results.    
 
2.  Are the information and information systems underlying Federal elections currently within 
Federal cybersecurity planning and oversight, under the Department of Homeland Security 
coordination or subject to the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)? 
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 No, thus far Federal statutory law and administrative provisions implementing the statutes 
remain silent, and thus exclude, information systems used to conduct Federal elections.  
Federal elections information security is not specifically listed in prior Executive Orders or 
in other documents recording administrative implementation of Federal Homeland security.   
President Obama’s cybersecurity Report helpfully mentions “e-voting” as within the scope 
of Federal concerns, but goes no further.   The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) mandates 
deployment of certain digital information systems without providing Federal authority for:   
 
o mandatory minimum security or reliability standards; 
 
o other oversight of the procurement, use, and maintenance of Federal elections 
information systems; 
 
o performance data regarding voter registration systems and voting systems,  from 
local or State administrators; or 
 
o auditing voter registration and voting systems for deterring “mischief,” and 
identifying software bugs and design issues that undermine voter access (eligibility to 
vote), election results accuracy, and overall election transparency. 
 
 The U.S. Election Assistance Commission, which HAVA charges to facilitate improvements 
in State management of elections, has not developed a respected track record on election 
security issues and should not be entrusted with Federal election security coordination. 
 
 
3.  Are there sound reasons that warrant the exclusion of information systems underlying Federal 
elections from overall Federal cybersecurity planning and protections? 
 
 No.  Other areas of shared Federal-State regulatory authority and of private sector 
commercial activities have been designated as “critical infrastructure” or as a “strategic asset” 
warranting Federal cybersecurity coordination.    
 
 Constitutional federalism and the traditional role of the State governments in administering 
Federal elections do not justify the exclusion of vulnerable elections information systems 
from Federal minimum standards and ongoing monitoring.    
 
o Federal deference to State governments to protect these information systems is 
especially unwarranted given the critical importance of democratic elections, the high 
level of expertise and resources needed to evaluate the risks and properly manage 
them, and the highly problematic record State election officers (county and State) 
have amassed thus far on election information security issues.   
 
o Federal elections infrastructure should be considered as part of U.S. national security 
infrastructure (though with transparency and public accountability), and as such 
would seem to be manifestly a federal regulatory responsibility. 
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B:  Evidence of Election Information and Information System Vulnerabilities 
 
1. Voter Registration Systems, including HAVA-mandated Statewide Voter  
Registration Databases 
 
These databases are not subject to any federal certification or testing, and States have not interposed 
standards.  The local databases range from MS Access, with lax security and significant reliability 
issues to specially designed and marketed Voter Registration databases (e.g., Diebold/Premier’s  
GEMS) with documented serious design and functional flaws.    
 
• Ohio’s Statewide Voter Registration Database (SVRD) sustained an attack in October 2008 
that caused the database to be shut down for a period of days;  no information was released. 
 
Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSTRE49K96820081021  
October 21, 2008   “The Web site of the Ohio state agency that handles voter registration and 
other election information was shut down briefly after it was hacked, an official said on Tuesday, 
vowing to guard against fraud in the key battleground state in the November 4 presidential 
contest. 
 
“Ohio Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner said the agency temporarily took the Secretary of State 
Web site at www.sos.state.oh.us down on Monday after "one or more" security breaches were 
detected.” 
 
• The EAC completed a report on “voter information” websites.  The author mentioned in 
press reports but not in the official report that: 
 
o Some States placed their statewide voter registration database live on-line, accessible 
via the Internet, rather than place an image on line.   
 
o  Some States’ management of their SVRD gravely endanger voters’ personal 
information, expanding opportunities for identity theft. 
 
• No independent study of the security and reliability of these SVRD has been conducted.  
These gateways to voting have been shrouded in secrecy.   
 
• The Ohio Secretary of State is planning to use in house technical staff to design and build a 
new SVRD.  No information as been released on his expertise, but it is highly unlikely that 
this staff member has the security expertise needed, or the other expertise, to design a 
complex, critical interoperable database such as is needed for SVRD purposes.  No Federal 
standards exist, however, and no “best technical design and practices” guidance.  
 
• Vast numbers of Cuyahoga County voters mysteriously “disappeared” from the GEMS 
database and were unable to vote in the Ohio 2004 general election.  “Updates” were 
installed to the voter registration database during the fall.  No review or assessment occurred 
as to the contents of the uploaded code.   
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For documentation and further development of these many of these voter registration points, see 
AMERICA VOTES! SUPPLEMENT, Chapter 3, Voting and Registration Technology Issues: Lessons 
from 2008 by Candice Hoke and David Jefferson (national security cybersecurity scientist at 
Lawrence Livermore National Labs) 
 
 
2. Election Tabulation-Management Systems 
 
• Virtually all voting systems use MS Windows operating systems, with their well-documented 
and continuing severe security problems.   
 
• Few States forbid connection of election tabulation servers to networks;  malware has been 
uploaded.   
 
• Not only have States not issued baseline, technically defensible election information security 
standards but those that have some standards do not have compliance and monitoring 
programs to determine and correct compliance. 
 
• At least 7 States currently permit emailed ballots in certain circumstances, and several more 
are currently considering various forms of Internet or telephonic voting.   
 
• Examples of documented problems follow.   
Worms found on the central tabulation system.   
Pinellas County, Florida. June 2008. Two malicious software programs (worms) were found on 
the central tabulation system.   
http://www.tampabay .com/news/loca lgovernment/art i c le605711.e ce  
"The two bugs, known as Flush.G and W32.SillyDC, work in tandem and go from computer to 
computer redirecting Internet browsers to sites the user hasn't selected, officials said. The worm is 
carried through removable media like USB drives, is easily detected and, officials say, rather 
harmless." The worms have been removed, and the Secretary of State has released a memo (pdf) 
urging election supervisors across Florida to take steps, including the use of antivirus software, to 
protect their voting systems from corruption.” Notably, the memo is no longer posted on the 
Internet.  
Virus in Sarasota Database 
October 2006. Sarasota County, Florida. An Internet service outage lasting approximately two 
hours occurred on Monday, 10/23/2006. The outage was caused by an unpatched database server 
that was compromised by a variant of the SQL Slammer worm. Once the server was infected, it sent 
traffic to other database severs on the Internet, and the traffic generated by the infected server 
rendered the firewall unavailable. 
This happened on the first day of early voting, and left voters unable to cast their ballots for about 
two hours.  This was the Jennings/Buchanan race, later litigated, and the state court declined to 
permit forensics reviews requested by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (attorneys).  
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Blog coverage: http://www.bradblog.com/?p=4480  
Register coverage: 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/05/17/sarasota_county_network_breached/  
Problem report:  
http://www.bradblog.com/Docs/SarasotaCounty_SQLSlammerWorm_IncidentReport_102407.pd
f  
Modem Problems over telephonic networks.  
 
May 2006, Cuyahoga County, Ohio:  modem tests over the weekend prior to the election conducted 
by numerous poll workers and other staff before the election left the tabulation server highly 
vulnerable for over 72 hours;  on election day, numerous modem transmissions failed. 
See Cuyahoga Election Review Panel Final Report, www.urban.csuohio.edu/cei 
 
August, 2008. Sarasota County, Florida. When workers tried to count absentee ballots on election 
night, the ES&S optical scan machines would not communicate with the server. So more than 
10,000 absentee ballots had to be hand-counted. "We could not get the absentee ballots totals to 
upload into the main server to combine all of the totals together for absentee early voting," says 
Supervisor of Elections Kathy Dent. 
http://www.mysuncoast.com/Global/story.asp?S=8911224 
“Low Turnout” in Hawaii Internet Election 
May, 2009. Hawaii. “For the first time, Oahu voters had to use computers or the telephone to vote 
for their neighborhood board candidates and many people did not bother.” Report of 80% fewer 
votes in this election. 
http://www.kitv.com/politics/19573770/detail.html   
Query whether all the votes attempted to be cast arrived at the destination.  The vendor did not set 
up systems to monitor transmission difficulties.    
States allowing completed ballots to be returned by email 
Eight states allow military voters to return their completed ballots by email. Pew says: 
“Unsecured e-mail can expose voters to identity theft, or their ballots could be tampered with. And 
states cannot be certain that the ballot they are receiving via email is the ballot sent by the military 
voter.” 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Election_reform/NTTV_Re
port_Web.pdf  
States using/considering Internet voting 
Michigan used Internet Voting in a 2004 Democratic primary.  
Hawaii used Internet Voting in a 2009 “Neighborhood” election.  
Washington State used Internet Voting in a 2009 King Conservation District election.  
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2009/04/prweb2292514.htm  
Kansas – a bill allowing email return of ballots for military is waiting for the Governor to sign.  
Illinois – introduced a bill to set up a commission to recommend Internet voting.  
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Alabama, Connecticut, Maryland, and Washington – considered email ballots for military, but 
the bills 
 
Part D.  Internet Voting paper delivered in Prague, 2008 (slightly revised) 
 
 
 
 
Internet Voting:  
 
Formulating Structural Governance Principles for  
Elections Cybersecurity   
 
 
Candice Hoke 
 
Cleveland State University, USA 
{shoke@me.com} 
 
 
Abstract:  In Europe, the U.S., and Asia, political and market forces seek regulatory approval for 
Internet-based voting and electoral administrative tasks. Governmental responses have differed, 
but commonly governments omit Internet and computer security experts from exercising decisive 
weight in such policy decisions.  Given its current architecture and engineering, the Internet 
provides neither high assurance data security and integrity, nor reliable information transmission 
protected from denial of service and other attacks. Nevertheless, pressures to expand Internet-
based election functions continue.  This paper  proceeds from the premise that democratic nations 
have not yet posed the question of what foundational features should be required in an elections 
governance system that is using (or is pressured to deploy) computer and network technologies. 
The paper submits that election administrative policy decisions are gravely affected by an 
information gap regarding both Internet security risks and the availability of effective mitigations for 
these risks.  The paper recommends disaggregating election tasks so that nuanced policy decisions 
can issue approving the Internet and other computer technologies for specific electoral tasks.  It 
presents seven core understandings that election policymakers must master for capacity to 
evaluate the relative risks and benefits of proposed computer-based election technologies, 
including the Internet.  It reviews exemplar vendor claims and marketing strategies that misinform 
policymakers, leading to porous balloting and the possibility of skewed or fraudulent election 
results.  The risks to and profound need to safeguard democratic legitimacy where critical 
functions are conducted on computers or the Internet thus warrant transnational elections 
regulatory reassessment. The paper concludes by recommending that revised governance 
structures incorporate three fundamental principles: expertise in computer and network 
engineering and security, as well as election administration; transparency and public 
accountability, in order that the election system and reported results have legitimacy; and 
transnational cooperation among democratic republics, to facilitate prompt mitigations and 
criminal prosecution for attacks on election information systems.  
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Key Words: Internet, voting, elections, governance, transparency, security, assurance, 
integrity, cybersecurity, mitigations, threats.   
 
 
 
1  Introduction  
 
The citizens of democratic republics select their core representatives through periodic public 
elections.  While the specific offices subject to election and the frequency of holding elections 
varies among nation-states, electing new governmental officers often impacts business 
opportunities, individual and business wealth, the use of military power, and a broad range of 
other governmental policies.  A national election in the most populous nations worldwide can 
affect vast wealth and the course of domestic and international events.   
 
The potentially high stakes of elections, and the history of intentional electoral disruptions and 
fraud in numerous countries worldwide, counsel governmental officials to engage in careful 
planning in order to protect election information and processes from deliberate attacks.  Security 
and contingency planning for elections differs among and within nations, with some significant 
variations in the physical contexts for conducting elections and in human factors such as poll 
staffing.  For those nations that use computer technologies for election administrative functions, 
election security has become increasingly complicated.  
  
This paper proceeds from the baseline fact that the Internet as currently architected and 
engineered provides neither high assurance data security and integrity, nor information 
transmission reliably impervious to deliberate targeted attacks and ubiquitous malware.  While 
these factors pose dangers for many entities and activities, elections are especially vulnerable.  
That voting occurs using anonymized data presents major hurdles to utilizing the Internet in a 
secure manner for casting ballots, though careful analysis and appropriate mitigations might permit 
other election tasks to be securely conducted..    
 
The paper argues that election policy decisions are affected by an information gap regarding both 
Internet security risks and the absence of effective mitigations and controls that can achieve 
assured election data and system integrity.  It recommends revised national governance structures 
based on three fundamental principles: expertise in computer and network engineering and 
security, but also in election administration; transparency and public accountability, in order that 
the election system and reported results have legitimacy; transnational cooperation among 
democratic republics, to facilitate prompt mitigations and criminal prosecutions.  
 
2  Current and Projected Uses of the Internet in Elections 
 
The pace of election administrative computerization appears to be rapidly increasing.  
Manufacturers of business automation systems have accelerated development of product 
adaptations for elections.  In the wake of the notorious U.S. presidential election of 2000, passage 
of the Help America Vote Act [1] stimulated vast computerization of elections.  The Act has 
spurred an array of new options in computer-based and networked equipment. In other nations, 
both market and “modernization” pressures have led to wide use of computers for election 
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functions.  Many European and Asian nations have joined the U.S. in using or planning transitions 
to electronic voting devices, tabulation systems, and a broad range of other equipment.  
 
Electronic equipment is now available that permits automation of most election functions, ranging 
from the creation of voter registration lists to the presentation of an electronic ballot to voters, to 
recording votes, and to tabulation and reporting election results.  Electronic databases often 
substitute for paper-based systems for retaining the lists of eligible voters and their personal 
information such as address, birth date, unique identifying number, and political party.  Voters 
may register to vote by visiting a website or by sending a registration document by email 
attachment or fax.  Software is increasingly used to design ballots, including automating the task of 
rotating candidates into the favored top position on different ballots so no one candidate holds that 
advantage.  Many voting machines use electronic ballots that humans have created on servers 
using complex election management software.   
 
Electronic voting devices may offer voters the option of ballot correction where the ballot contains 
marks for too many candidates in a race (“overvoting”). Vote data may be recorded on removable 
digital memory media as well as on internal components such as flash memory in order to 
produce “redundant” vote data records.1  Voting devices may incorporate hardware and firmware 
for network transmission of election information, including for sending vote data electronically 
from remote polling locations; these transmissions may occur using the Internet, T1 or common 
telephone lines instead of physically transporting memory devices such as thumb drives and 
memory cards.  From security and data integrity standpoints, arguably the most problematic 
electronic voting initiatives are efforts to permit remote voting from personal computers that use 
operating systems documented to have serious security flaws.  These deficiencies are then 
compounded by the security issues of current Internet architecture. [2] 
 
2.1 Absentee Ballot Transmissions   Jurisdictions often allow voters to request “absentee” ballots 
when the voter will be physically absent on Election Day.  Others permit “no-fault” or 
convenience voting from home, regardless of the reason.  These requests or applications formerly 
were confined to paper documents sent through traditional mails or delivered by hand.  
Technological options have expanded to include, depending on the jurisdiction, applying at a 
website, by email, or by fax.    
 
Absentee ballots are the crucible for aggressive expansion in the election system’s use of Internet 
data transmissions.  The pressure in the U.S. arises mainly from efforts to ensure that those in 
overseas military service are not inadvertently disenfranchised by delays in ballot transmissions. 
[3]  Sending blank or unvoted ballots to absent and overseas voters has traditionally occurred by 
mail.  Some election offices are now using the Internet to transmit the blank ballot to the absentee 
voter.  Yet other jurisdictions ranging from Estonia [4] to a U.S. pilot project in Okaloosa, Florida 
[5] have experimented with casting ballots -- voting in an actual election -- on a website described 
as “secure,” by using an encrypted emailed ballot, or by using telephonic networks.  These options 
theoretically permit almost instantaneous delivery of both balloting materials and the return voted 
                                                
1  Independent “red team” or penetration studies of voting systems have demonstrated that the supposed redundant memory 
systems may be subject to deliberate attacks that can cause the various locations to hold discrepant rather than redundant vote 
totals. [1], [2]  
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ballots, shortening the transmission time by at least 90% over the time required by traditional 
mailing of paper.  
 
The authenticity of a voter’s absentee ballot signature is increasingly verified by electronic means, 
using a digital or optical scanner connected to a computer that compares the signature on file with 
the signature on the submitted absentee ballot envelope. High volume urban election offices have 
often been first to adopt this technology.  Originally developed for financial institutions that 
process bank cheques, these systems compare the voter’s two signatures as part of the voter and 
ballot verification process.  The machines must be calibrated, allowing discretionary human 
decision in the degree of deviation between the signatures on record and the absentee ballot 
materials.  
 
2.2  Integration of Telephony and Other Networks. Networks used in elections encompass more 
than the Internet, however. In addition to telephonic transmissions of some electoral information, 
ballot tabulation systems often use components linked by Ethernet. Election software produces 
race results from raw database values, which officials then upload to the Internet for public access 
using network connections or memory media.   
 
2.3  Other Electoral Uses of the Internet.  Some vendors send election “management” software 
patches over the Internet for uploading into the local election equipment.  The software systems 
that require patches are used for ballot configuration and for tabulations. Software patches are also 
sent via the Internet for updating the voter registration databases.  Electronic poll-books can be 
used to connect poll workers to the voter registration database in order to verify the voter’s 
eligibility to vote; these often communicate via the Internet.  The electronic ballot files that are 
used for printing paper ballots may be posted on the Internet for proofing by political parties and 
the candidates.  These ballot configurations can then be transmitted over the Internet to the ballot 
printer so the printer order may be fulfilled.      
 
2.4  Disaggregating Election Tasks for Security Assessments 
 
Established precepts of information security assessment direct that each task or function sought to 
be conducted using computer or network technologies must be separately evaluated in a threat 
assessment.  [19],  [20]  Such disaggregation may result in identifying election administrative tasks 
to which the Internet presents low risks and compensating efficiencies.  Examples include the 
Internet posting of voter information regarding the candidates, ballot issues, and location and 
timing of voting. Web-based additional “voter services,” such as the posting of absentee ballot 
applications and voter registration forms, are also potentially low-risk.    
 
 
3  The Election Equipment Marketplace Meets Internet Security Science  
 
Security has become a primary focus for Internet participants and information system 
administrators, in both the private and public sectors. The firm or enterprise IT governance 
decisions must include types of access controls, authentication systems, and life cycle security.  
The popular press has covered major intrusions into supposedly “secure” networks that have 
compromised credit card and other personal financial data, telephone billing records, and the U.S. 
government’s witness protection program.  These reports underscore that the Internet generates 
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significant vulnerabilities at the same time as benign opportunities for broad communication. [21] 
The Internet places in jeopardy core human values such as personal privacy.  [22] [23] [24]  
 
In market-based nations, private sector, for-profit firms design, manufacture, and market 
specialized software hardware components for election administration.  Many of these firms have 
been shown to overstate their voting system products’ compliance with fundamental tenets of an 
Information Technology (IT) Security Program and misrepresent the scope of activities needed to 
achieve defense in depth.2  In independent studies, computer and security scientists have 
documented profound risks to election data integrity and equipment reliability owing to insecure 
equipment and flawed managerial security policies. [6], [7], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15].   
 
Internet-based software systems for voter authentication, ballot delivery and return of votes or 
“voted ballots” are no longer fanciful speculations.  Private sector vendors are promoting their new 
wares for “secure Internet voting,” replete with resuscitation of the false but previously persuasive 
analogy of voting to banking via automatic tellers and personal computers.  The new Internet 
voting vendors are actively soliciting election officials to purchase their software products that will 
enable voted ballots to be transmitted over the Internet for tabulation in elections offices.  In May 
2009, one Internet voting marketing executive argued:   
 
The introduction of technology to any process is scary. But the time has come. We have 
been banking online and shopping online for over a decade, and conducting important 
business by phone for a century. Digital technology, while no panacea, is the best 
method ever invented for securely delivering information and decisions. [25] 
 
3.1  Vendor Claims.   The vendors’ marketing claims include that the Internet:   
 
 Permits voting to be as secure and private as personal banking transactions;  
 Will achieve a net reduction of the financial costs of conducting elections;  
 Will expand voter participation in the electoral system by making voting more convenient 
and accessible; and,  
 Should be accepted as part of social and technological progress, of updating systems to 
accommodate youthful tastes and expectations (the “cool” factor).   
 
3.2  Two Empirical Baselines. In considering the fitness of the Internet for conducting particular 
election administrative tasks, and the wisdom of permitting a caveat emptor market for Internet 
voting software in lieu of governmental regulation, two constellations of empirical fact should be 
kept in view.  First, the profound security deficiencies independent researchers documented in 
privately produced, for-profit digital voting equipment3 (despite the contrary vendors’ 
representations) should raise questions regarding the credibility of election vendors’ claims that the 
new voting products “securely” deliver voted ballots and voting materials over the Internet.  In 
                                                
2 Documentation reviews of three commercially produced voting systems formed a part of the California Secretary of State’s Top 
to Bottom Review of Voting Systems. All evaluators reported critical omissions in security documentation and risk mitigation. 
[8], [9], [10].  Principles for achieving defense in depth in election information systems are not qualitatively different from those 
established for IT systems for other facing significant threats.  [6] 
3 In the “red team” overview report on California voting systems, Dr. Matt Bishop stated: “the security mechanisms provided for 
all systems were inadequate to ensure accuracy and integrity of the election results and of the systems that provide those results.” 
[6] With only minor differences, these same systems are used in many other States.  
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short, the electronic elections industry equipment’s past security representations have 
misrepresented the systems’ security achievements, and the industry has chosen to market 
equipment that presents major risks to election integrity. [8], [9], [10], [11], [13]. 
 
The second but perhaps more significant empirical baseline relates to the Internet’s technical and 
engineering facts. The Internet lacks the capacity for high assurance information transmissions and 
information systems, whether for elections functions, military communications, or other 
transactions.  Specific election objectives include packet transmissions that cannot be delayed, 
blocked, modified, or intercepted, because otherwise voter disenfranchisement and possibly a 
fraudulent election will ensue. [2] Election-related websites, for instance, that are designed for 
distributing voter information, for enabling voter registration, or for casting ballots, continue to be 
vulnerable to malware, denial-of-service (DOS) and distributed DOS attacks. Underestimating the 
volume demands for website access for a major election can also gravely impair election 
outcomes and vitiate the election’s legitimacy.  Mitigations that reduce these threats to minute 
levels of potential impact are not available or foreseeable in the near future.  
 
3.3 Private Vendors, Market Pressures and the Internet Security Information Gap.  In addition to 
lacking computer security training, policymakers empowered to decide which election functions 
to automate using IT systems may well lack sufficient knowledge to evaluate the types and impacts 
of risks that are endemic to such systems. At least six core insights are needed by those vested with 
decisional power concerning when and how the Internet shall be used in election functions.    
 
 3.3.1 Pervasive software coding deficiencies and their election consequences: Sometimes 
popularly termed “bugs,” coding deficiencies have been identified to pose grave security 
consequences for all IT systems. [16], [17],  [18] These coding errors open election 
software to easy, high impact attacks on election systems and data that may easily escape 
detection and redress, but the errors can also lead to data inaccuracies and machine 
unreliability having no basis in  deliberate attack. 
 
 3.3.2  Internet transmitted malware and options to manipulate data speed:  The worms, 
viruses and other ubiquitous malware can impair election functions, as can strategically 
timed high Internet data volume that can cause speed of transmissions to fall precipitously.   
 
 3.3.3  Labeling election technology products and websites as “Secure” and “Reliable”:  In 
contrast to the labeling requirements for prescription drugs, many food products, and 
dangerous chemicals, governments have generally not restricted vendors from using these 
quasi-scientific, psychologically seductive terms in their marketing literature and 
presentations.  Even though the terms deceptively suggest compliance with accepted 
standards for security, governments have permitted their use. 
 
 3.3.4 Re-transmitters access and consequences for information privacy and security: 
Third-party re-transmission sites such as ISPs permit some ISP employees the access to read 
message contents.  This intrusion does not require sophisticated technical abilities or 
equipment, but only a text viewer or word processing program. The fundamental insecurity 
of these transmissions means that email forgery or modification, identity theft, and business 
transaction interceptions are becoming major types of criminal fraud. The SERVE Report 
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continues to stand as a comprehensive typology of Internet voting threat genre, most of 
which are insoluble with current architecture and engineering. [2] 
 
 3.3.5 Encryption does not suffice:  Data encryption is not a complete or effective 
mitigation for most threats Internet information transmissions pose for elections .[2]  
 
 3.3.6 Concealed, untraceable attacks yet the appearance of information security: Attacks 
that disrupt election processes, or result in fraudulent election totals, may be completely 
hidden and untraceable. [2]   
 
 3.3.7  Security mitigations and Internet re-engineering solutions that will achieve high 
assurance are not imminent:  Funding entities such as the U.S. National Science 
Foundation are underwriting major research efforts to re-envision the Internet. [26] As a 
result of this multi-faceted research, potentially radical revisions to Internet architecture, 
engineering, and communication protocols may occur.  The transformations may, for 
instance, include multiple “Internets” with controlled network access and other enhanced 
technical security features.  But these will not be available in the near future, and probably 
not for another decade or longer.     
 
Even if current or future research endeavors successfully achieve high assurance security 
architecture and engineering, computer security science teaches that these do not comprise the 
entirety of factors relevant to evaluating information security risks.  Computer and network security 
is not an output of merely technological attributes.  Rather, physical security (such as locks on 
doors and surveillance cameras), staff expertise, staff continuing education and values 
commitment to security compliance, and other factors can play as significant a role in the security 
quotient as the technological features. [6] Further, physical, managerial, and staffing contexts 
within which the election technologies are deployed will not be static.  Thus, threat analysis and 
policy formation must occur in a dynamic manner, a task that an effective elections cybersecurity 
agency should undertake.   
 
4  A Governance System for Internet-Based Election Tasks?  
 
Unquestionably, the Internet offers profound democratization and communicative benefits that 
should not be impeded4 without a sound basis in other fundamental democratic elections values. 
The Internet need not be placed off-limits to deployment in elections.  However, the rapid 
commercialization of the Internet and World Wide Web in ways incompatible with individual and 
the larger public interest raises concerns that election processes could be similarly skewed. As 
Peter Neumann and others have noted, such incompatibilities have surfaced in domain name 
policy, spam, security, encryption, freedom of speech issues, privacy, content rating and filtering, 
and many other areas.[24], [25] The governance systems that determine how to use the Internet in 
election administration must have the capacity to evaluate the risks soberly without becoming 
enmeshed in overly rosy technological utopianism or subject to regulatory capture by for-profit 
vendors.  The structure should require, and the governance culture embrace, the duty to protect 
the integrity of elections processes. 
                                                
4 Michael Froomkin reviews strategies for achieving the communicative and democratizing opportunities the Internet offers as a 
part of his overall assessment of Internet governance structures. [21] 
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The proposal outlined here recommends a national regulatory apparatus that will not rely 
predominantly on issuance of rules and technical standards to be met, or particular product 
design. Rather, it should review and issue particularized decisions on whether an election office 
proposal for using Internet transmissions for a specified election task is permissible in light of all 
factors relevant to security based on layered defense.  Thus, governance personnel would need to 
remain abreast of technical and security developments, and obtain information on staff education 
and security physical contexts, in order to decide the question before it.   
 
The analogue in the Anglo-American legal system would be courts of chancery, where equitable 
review employed principles to guide wise decisions in light of all the facts, rather than use 
mandatory common law precedents to compel certain outcomes.    
 
Recognizing that information security is one objective among many, the agency will need to be 
structured to maintain personnel with election administrative knowledge and not only those with 
technical and security training.  The range of expertise would facilitate balancing the competing 
objectives of speed of transmission, low administrative costs; auditability; reliability; 
environmental impact; and voter convenience/access as against data security.  
 
4.1   Regulatory Scope and Definitions 
 
Elections cybersecurity5 recognizes that the election information systems hold valuable 
information that both outsiders and insiders may seek to compromise.   The underlying policy 
objectives are to prevent or to neutralize potential negative consequences for voters and the 
election process because computers, networks, and information technology systems transmissions 
were used.  The negative impact to be avoided may arise from deliberate attack, such as 
disruptions of electoral processes via DOS or viral attacks, and undesired intrusions that can 
produce fraudulent election records, such as by malware or unauthorized access to databases for 
manipulating voter registries or vote totals.  Election cybersecurity also seeks to protect the 
personal and other data held within the election administrative system, where unauthorized access 
can lead to identity theft.   
 
4.2   Principles for Trustworthy Public Elections  
 
At present, the international community has not generated a common set of standards for 
democratic elections or even agreed on criteria for assessing the adequacy of election processes.  
The Carter Center’s Democracy Program has urged the international community to recognize the 
need for election observation organizations to work collaboratively work to build consensus on 
criteria for assessing elections, including electronic elections.i Other commentators and courts 
have offered their views of fundamental election integrity principles based on the constitutional 
law of their nation. [27], [28], [30] 
 
                                                
5 “Election cybersecurity” encompasses the objectives of information and system security, reliability, and data integrity with 
regard to the computers and networks used to record, process, and report election-related information at all points in the electoral 
process. The term encompasses all electronic and electromagnetic communications including telephony, fax, and Internet, in each 
case inclusive of wired and wireless, analog and digital systems.  The term reflects one facet of the more comprehensive systemic 
governmental duty to achieve election integrity. 
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Increasingly, courts and commentators are urging that election law include as fundamental rights 
principles of transparency and public accountability for election processes. [29], [30] Germany’s 
high court invalidated certain uses of computers in elections, resting its decision on the core 
requirement of election transparency to the public.  The Court emphasized the “principle of the 
public… which prescribes that all essential steps of an election are subject to the possibility of 
public scrutiny unless other constitutional interests justify an exception.” [30] In the Court’s view, 
the voters themselves must be able to understand without detailed knowledge of computer 
technology whether their votes cast are recorded in an unadulterated manner as the basis of vote 
counting, or at any rate as the basis of a later recount. If the election result is determined through 
computer-controlled processing of the votes stored in an electronic memory, it is not sufficient if 
merely the result of the calculation process carried out in the voting machine can be taken note of 
by means of a summarizing printout or an electronic display. 
 
Translating the core principles for trustworthy elections into computer security terminology, 
elections must maintain in demonstrable ways data integrity at all points in the process; assure the 
availability of systems for voters to register and to cast valid ballots that will be counted; and, 
provide accountability systems such as random auditing that will provide public transparency and 
equipment checks.  Election technology security and auditing features can be designed to achieve 
each of these objectives, but often software vendors do not invest in developing effective security. 
As one computer security commentator has noted, "the buying public has no way to differentiate 
real security from bad security." [18] A better regulatory apparatus can facilitate product 
development that meets higher standards of software security in the elections arena, without the 
need for expanding use of product liability lawsuits for defective software products.    
 
4.3 Recommendations for the Elections Cybersecurity Regulatory Structure and Powers 
 
4.3.1  Dynamic Decisionmaking  
At the threshold level, two regulatory paths can be identified as potentially offering sufficient 
election cybersecurity policy determinations:  (1) An aggressive, bright line approach:  codification 
of a legal barrier to any use of digital equipment, of equipment that depends on software and 
networks, for any mission critical election task within the electoral jurisdiction; or (2) creation or 
revision of a regulatory apparatus that reviews applications and can authorize election 
administration to use digital equipment and networks for some election tasks under specified 
conditions.    
 
While a complete barrier might appear to provide the most substantial election cybersecurity 
protection, its rigidity and overbreadth would render it an unstable policy approach. It would also 
invalidate many current practices without any review of the alternatives and their risk factors.  
Given that risks and technological options change over time, a more dynamic regulatory approach 
would be more prudent.  The law could vest the regulatory entity (hereafter termed Board) with 
conducting sophisticated security assessments in light of all relevant factors known when the   
application is reviewed.  This approach would be more consistent with the dynamism of the 
technologies and risk environments, allow review of the applicant’s most recent record on security 
policies implementation, and other facts.   
 
4.3.2 National Supervisory Authority  
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Where the government must capably respond to external threats that are dynamic rather than static 
and that present threats to the entire nation, it is appropriate for the regulatory entity to be 
positioned at the national level.  Economies of scale and heightened expertise can be achieved 
that preserve scarce resources. Given cybersecurity’s dynamic set of serious threats, it is unrealistic 
to expect that local and Provincial/State governmental authorities will have the resources, the 
expertise, and the political will to invest in oversight of elections cybersecurity issues.  
 
4.3.3  Structure and Staffing  
A regulatory structure that can balance the need for diverse political involvement and public 
accountability with the need to utilize appropriate expertise is an independent Board with a 
professional staff.  A statute could allocate to national legislative and executive leaders the power 
of appointment.  Nominations of technical and security professionals could be allocated to 
qualified professional organizations as an extra assurance for appropriate expertise. Legislative 
leaders of varying major parties could be vested with power to appoint without a nominating 
intermediary experienced election administrators and public interest advocates on election 
transparency, privacy and security issues.  
 
Professional associations having expertise in the requisite areas, such as the ACM and the IEEE, 
could be vested with the power to nominate a short list of experts with statutorily specified 
credentials.6  The law could name high official (e.g., President or Prime Minister) to review 
nominees and appoint them to office for a specified term of office.  Avoiding service at the 
pleasure of the appointing officials would help to ensure that the Board’s decisions are evidence-
based and not a matter of political influence. 
 
The Board’s cybersecurity work would require a professional staff. In some nations including the 
U.S., elections administrative processes have often been staffed with political patronage 
appointees who sometimes lacked the skill set and knowledge base needed to run administratively 
competent and secure elections.  A national elections cybersecurity Board can provide a 
counterbalance. The permanent staffing expertise could be specified by statute and direct:  
 
 Significant technical expertise be present (including network security, computer security, secure 
database and database management expertise, software development and testing; IT auditing 
and computer/voting system forensics);   
 Significant election administration expertise, preferably having experience in computer-based 
election technologies and a record of achievement in implementing election security best 
practices, achieving a security culture, and establishing effective auditing and accountability 
systems;  
 The Board and staff to engage election officials “in the field” – in their election offices and on-
site in actual elections -- and with States’ chief election officers to promote informational 
interchanges about the complexities and risks presented by election technologies and their 
possible mitigations 
 Board and staff executives have both information systems and security expertise plus election 
administrative experience; 
 Satisfaction of high personal and professional ethics standards.    
                                                
6 If international professional organizations such as the ACM, IEEE, and ISACA were each to develop the capacity for national 
divisions within specialized expertise, lodging nominating powers there might be less controversial.   
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4.3.4  Sophisticated, Nuanced Cybersecurity Assessments 
While renowned computer and network security experts appear to agree that security is a series of 
complicated tradeoffs, [6], [23], [34] not an abstract property of equipment or systems, structuring 
a regulatory agency to undertake informed, nuanced and voter-protective cybersecurity 
evaluations is qualitatively different task than training individuals in these skills.  Regulatory 
entities are often subject to political appointee leadership who might lack critical knowledge or 
capacities for sound judgment.  The regulated firms often seek and sometimes achieve “regulatory 
capture.”   Flawed personnel decisions can vitiate a sound structural approach that is designed to 
achieve the nuanced decisions needed for national and election security-sensitive policies.   
 
Despite the risks that the regulatory entity may not be staffed or structured well, the status quo 
presents too many risks for its continuation.  By combining explicit requirements for expertise and 
public accountability, the regulatory framework may enhance the likelihood that nuanced, sound 
judgments will issue.   
 
Given that effective computer security is virtually never strictly a property of technical equipment 
but rather a function of the interaction of people (including security training and practices), 
equipment features (such as avoidance of software coding errors known to introduce vectors for 
attack) and physical circumstances (including physical security, such as locks and video 
surveillance), regulatory systems dedicated to achieving high information and information system 
security cannot evaluate only the equipment’s technical features.  In the U.S., for instance, the 
Voluntary Voting System Guidelines and accompanying federal lab testing program commits 
precisely this error, among many others. [33] Highly laudable technical and network security 
features can be negated by human errors and omissions.  Conversely, poorly designed software 
and other technical security deficiencies can be somewhat mitigated by security practices 
including staff compliance assessments. [6]  “Layered defense” security principles prescribe 
multiple levels and types of security mechanisms, to force an attacker to breach several rather than 
only one to compromise the system.  The Board should be charged to evaluate all defensive layers 
when determining the acceptability of a proposed use of the Internet in election functions.  
 
4.3.5  Initial Decisions and Burden of Proof 
The Board will face threshold decisions concerning which election administrative or voting tasks 
that are currently using the Internet can continue to do so and under what conditions.  The Help 
America Vote Act of 2002, [35] by contrast, in some respects appears to assume that all election 
related activities can be securely conducted over the Internet -- a flawed assumption. [36] [2] The 
law could impose the burden on proof that the on the applicant for permission to utilize the 
Internet, with a required showing that risks to election data security and integrity are highly remote 
and very low in potential impact.  The risk of nonpersuasion would thereby be legally reposed in 
the applicant.   
 
Another structural mechanism by which to protect the voting public and election integrity could 
be to require a specified supermajority of Board members, for instance,75% or 85% of the 
members, to approve any proposed elections use of the Internet as sufficiently secure. 
 
4.3.6  Specific Powers and Duties   
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The Board could be vested with broader statutory authority to protect election security and 
integrity, including for instance:  
• The authority to identify election practices and procedures, such as connecting an election 
tabulation server to the Internet, that present grave security threats, and have the power to 
require cessation of the practice.      
• The power to issue binding technical, operational, and other minimum standards for each 
discrete election function that is permitted to be conducted over the Internet or other networks, 
and to bar functions if network involvement presents significant risks to the security, reliability, 
ballot secrecy, and accuracy of elections. 
 
If a bright line statutory barrier to Internet delivery of voted ballots should be contemplated instead 
of vesting the power in the Board, three major arguments will be raised that these questions should 
be subject to a more nuanced agency decision making process.  First, in those nations that 
maintain a two-stage election tally process, where preliminary or unofficial vote tallies are 
followed by more a more careful thorough canvass (often known as the official or certified results), 
the claim will be that any intrusion into networked tallies and transmissions of voted ballots can be 
corrected at the official count.  Thus, use of networked communications should not be off limits 
for transmitting preliminary tallies and voted ballots.    
 
Second, arguments will be lodged that where Internet communications are permitted to be used 
for delivery of voted ballots and vote tallies, whether for unofficial or official tallying, rigorous 
auditing will deter attacks and also permit correction of tallies if attacks should occur.  While 
rigorous auditing indeed should be mandatory, its limits must be recognized.  While auditing is a 
commonplace in government and business financial matters, auditing elections remains quite 
novel with nascent professional standards.  When pressed to audit elections, governments often 
claim to “audit” without using, for instance, random sampling procedures, auditing every contest, 
or using statistical auditing models that provide a 98% degree of confidence that the audited races’ 
results were correctly reported.  Post-election auditing cannot function as a reliable check on 
networked election communications as through the Internet, nor can it recover blocked ballots or 
tampered  
 
Finally, in some locations, internal election administrative culture urges employees not to disrupt 
public confidence in the agency or its electoral process by reporting irregularities.  Given that 
some administrators would have decided to use vulnerable networked transmissions, tacit or 
explicit pressures may be placed to confirm that no mischief occurred in the original transmissions 
or other discretionary tallying processes, rather than might reveal the flawed planning and 
ignorance of the serious risks.    
 
Legislation can remove from the arsenal of discretionary local and State decision making the 
options that imperil election integrity. The legislature need not conclude that voted ballots and 
vote tallies can never be securely transmitted over networks such as the Internet, but rather 
recognize that the array of prerequisites and resources required, such as exceptional expertise, 
contingency planning, ongoing training, and special equipment, to effectively manage and 
respond to the dynamic development of cyberthreats, does not warrant discretionary authority be 
placed outside the national Board.  Allowing the local governments to be more security conscious 
than the national Board should remain within the permitted range.  
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4.3.7  Achieving Public Accountability and Effective Cybersecurity Compliance   
 
To achieve transparency and accountability objectives, [37] the Board must be subject to 
“sunshine” laws that compel an agency to publicly post its activities, actions and documents, and 
conduct its decision-making sessions in the public domain.  These requirements would necessitate 
that security clearances and classified information not be presented to the Board.   
 
To achieve the accountability needed for public confidence and legitimate elections, the elections 
cybersecurity statute should also:    
 
 Authorize the Board’s rulemaking powers to encompass procedures to guarantee meaningful 
end-to-end auditability and accountability for every ballot, including those transmitted 
electronically or electromagnetically;  
 Vest the Board and the national Justice ministry with concurrent authority to commence an 
investigation into any violation of the elections cybersecurity rules;  
 Direct the Agency to initiate a process by which citizens can provide notice to it of alleged 
violations of elections cybersecurity rules, shield their identity from public disclosure, and 
provide effective whistleblower protection from adverse employment consequences to those 
who report possible elections cybersecurity violations.  
 
4.4 Transnational Cooperation 
 
Internet and information security threats are systemic and world-wide. Sharing information on 
election cybersecurity risks and attempted attacks can augment mitigations and criminal 
prosecutions.  Internationally negotiated procedures will be needed. 
 
4.5 The U.S. Election Assistance Commission 
 
The chief federal agency acting on electoral administrative issues is the U.S. Election Assistance 
Commission (EAC).   An extensive analysis of the EAC’s structure, powers, staffing, and record on 
technical issues in elections leads to the conclusion that a different agency, likely located within 
the Department of Homeland Security, should be vested with the powers to regulate the electoral 
functions that could securely utilize the Internet. [38]  The EAC has no national security expertise, 
and the agency record shows that it has lacked both appreciation of the risks that inhere in the 
Internet and the types of technical expertise requisite to manage complex computer networks 
when election tasks are concerned.  
 
5  Conclusion  
 
Internet security experts might analogize the Internet to a swiftly moving river within which 
information can be trapped or modified with the ease of trout fishing in a well-stocked backwoods 
stream.  But at the elections policy and equipment procurement levels, the Internet security 
information gap means the Internet is hazily viewed as analogous to an armored currency delivery 
truck, protected by security guards who are trained and equipped with weapons befitting 
paramilitary officers. Thus protected, they mistakenly gauge cause as an extremely remote 
possibility the likelihood of intercepted or fraudulent information deliveries.  
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The computerization and networking of governmental functions including elections, the critical 
importance of election legitimacy, and the serious Internet security information gap warrant 
innovative thinking and redesigned governmental structures.  Democratic governments must 
structurally assure that appropriate technical and security expertise plays a decisive role in policy 
decisions concerning election administrative use of the Internet.   ican be structured to manage 
elections cybersecurity, thus providing far better voter and national security protection than 
available previously.      
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